Lessons Learned from the Phase-out of the MFA: Moving from Managed Distortion to Managed Distortion by Hudson, Darren et al.
Volume 12 Number 1 2011/p.29-43  esteyjournal.com 
Editorial Office: 410 22
nd St. E., Suite 820, Saskatoon, SK, Canada, S7K 5T6. 




Lessons Learned from the Phase-out 
of the MFA: Moving from Managed 
Distortion to Managed Distortion 
Darren Hudson 
Director, Cotton Economics Research Institute and Larry Combest Chair of 
Agricultural Competitiveness, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, 
Texas Tech University 
Don Ethridge 
Professor Emeritus, Cotton Economics Research Institute, Department of Agricultural 
and Applied Economics, Texas Tech University 
Maria Mutuc 
Post-doctoral Researcher, Cotton Economics Research Institute, Department of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics, Texas Tech University 
While the elimination of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) was presumed to be a net 
global benefit because it represented an elimination of a distortionary set of trade 
agreements, it was based on the assumption that the underlying global trading regime 
was based on free trade principles. However, due to the trading pattern that has 
emerged after the MFA and its unintended consequences – with production 
infrastructure and trading rules based on distortionary incentives so entrenched into the 
system – the global trading regime after the elimination of quotas is still far short of 
free. 
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Introduction  
he establishment and the eventual phase-out of the Multifibre Arrangement 
(MFA) have the potential to offer lessons about managed trade. While many 
factors have influenced the market outcomes in textiles and clothing (T&C), this paper 
attempts to distill key elements that can form the foundation of a better understanding 
of changes in managed trade systems for the future. Filtering history can be difficult 
because of the myriad of confounding causal factors that result in observed behaviour. 
Nevertheless, a retrospective can be useful because it passes observations through a 
prism that can delineate some root causes and consequences. This paper proceeds as 
follows. First, a brief history of the textile and clothing MFA is presented. Next, some 
of the unintended consequences of textile trade policy are discussed. Third, the pre–
MFA phase-out estimates of impacts and a comparison of those estimates with actual 
outcomes are summarized. Fourth, an overview of the MFA phase-out and some of the 
policy responses in the wake of (or in conjunction with) the phase-out are presented. 
Finally, we offer some lessons learned from the MFA removal process and some 
questions for the future.  
A Brief History 
The MFA, and more broadly, managed textile trade, were sources of consternation for 
many in an increasingly global industry for many years. Much of the developed world 
today began its development process with textile production during the Industrial 
Revolution of the 1700s. The early American colonies, for example, were major 
suppliers of raw cotton into British textile factories until a viable textile industry arose 
in the American north. Because of the importance of these industries in developed 
countries, they developed political influence. 
To some extent, textile manufacturing had begun a slow transition to developing 
countries by the end of the 1920s, but that transition was significantly disrupted 
during World War II. By the 1950s, countries like Japan had resumed rapid expansion 
of textile production as a means of development and recovery. These producing 
countries quickly began to gain economies of scale and use that lower cost of 
production to capture market share in developed countries (Reinert, 2000; Hayashi, 
2005; Finger and Harrison, 1994; Spinanger, 1999).  
The pressure quickly began to build in developed countries to somehow control or 
manage the imports of textiles from developing countries. In fact, in 1955, European 
countries elected to invoke Article XXXV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and withhold trading rights with Japan (Finger and Harrison, 1994; 
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Spinanger, 1999).
1 At the same time (perhaps in return for the United States’ support 
for Japan’s membership in the GATT), Japan agreed to voluntary export restraints on 
textile and apparel exports to the United States.  
After a number of alternative short-term arrangements, countries ultimately 
agreed to a Long-term Agreement (LTA) on trade in textiles in 1962. This agreement 
provided for quantitative restrictions on trade of textile products, allowing for some 
growth in quotas. This agreement was extended in 1967 and 1970. The growth in 
man-made fibre (MMF) production complicated this process because MMF 
production was not covered in the LTA. After extensive negotiation, the LTA was 
extended to cover MMFs, resulting in the modern MFA system in 1974 (Reinert, 
2000; Hayashi, 2005; Finger and Harrison, 1994; Spinanger, 1999). 
The MFA was subsequently used to negotiate numerous bilateral agreements 
between the United States and major textile producers, a practice that was adopted 
quickly by the EU and other developed countries. This system enabled developed 
importing countries to impose quotas against imports from developing countries (and 
newly developed countries like Japan) considered to be low-cost suppliers of textiles 
and clothing. After several renewals, political pressure was building in developing 
countries questioning the rationality of the MFA system, and by the mid 1980s there 
was a strong desire to negotiate an end to the MFA system. During the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations, the MFA was subsumed in the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC), which took effect in 1995. The ATC provided for the eventual 
elimination of MFA quotas in 2005. 
Unintended Consequences of the MFA 
There are both intended an unintended consequences in any intervention into markets. 
The unintended consequences arise because of hidden incentives that support 
behaviours that were not desired or anticipated. The MFA is no exception. In this 
section, we outline a few of the unintended consequences that are critical to 
understanding the outcome of the MFA phase-out.  
One of the unintended consequences of the MFA was to create T&C industries in 
poorer, least-developed countries (LDCs) as quota-constrained economies shifted 
investments to countries with low levels of quota utilization (a strategy that can be 
called quota-hopping foreign investment). Korean companies established factories in 
Bangladesh, Caribbean countries and Sub-Saharan Africa, Chinese companies set up 
factories in some Asian and African locations, Indian companies in Nepal, and even 
small businesses in Sri Lanka and Mauritius organized factories in the Maldives and 
Madagascar (Adhikari and Yamamoto, 2007). While some of these economies were   D. Hudson, D. Ethridge, M. Mutuc 
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able to indigenize the T&C industry, others were unable to generate local investments 
into the sector. These latter countries were able to increase their exports without 
needing to improve their essential competitive strengths and infrastructures. This 
occurrence represents a production pattern brought about by misaligned incentives 
(not necessarily due to comparative advantage) for resource allocation in response to 
quotas under the MFA (UNDP, 2005). 
Exporting countries can be grouped into four categories based on their T&C 
system arrangements: (1) countries with vertically integrated production in both 
textiles and clothing, such as China and India; (2) countries that have limited 
capability in both textiles and apparel, such as Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam; (3) 
middle-income countries that have mainly apparel capability, like Sri Lanka and the 
Philippines and (4)  LDCs such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Nepal 
(Adhikari and Weeratunge, 2006). Where a country lies in these categories appears to 
have an important correlation with its post-MFA success. Countries in category 1 
appear to have had the cash reserves necessary to create vertically integrated systems 
that could capture the benefits of the MFA removal. As we move down the categories, 
countries rely more on imported fabrics and accessories; this underscores the 
importance of infrastructure and trade facilitation. 
Another example of an unintended effect of the MFA was transshipment of 
clothing to falsely declare items as originating from countries with unused quota or to 
allow for residual upgrading (adding buttons to shirts, for instance) (Dayaratna-Banda 
and Whalley, 2007). Here, some countries with significant T&C “production” had no 
apparent basis for being T&C producers (that is, no apparent comparative advantage 
or policy instrument that would lead to competitive advantage). Besides generating 
trade flows that were counterintuitive, the existence of transshipment activities 
exacted more resource costs on importing countries to prevent circumvention than 
would have been incurred absent transshipment. 
Of course, the normal ebbs and flows of trade and production based on economic 
incentives did occur. For example, over time, economies like Korea, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia and Taiwan (which were highly competitive in the T&C sector until the 
early 1980s) shifted to higher-value-added, less-labour-intensive products. Today, 
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam have taken over the 
labour-intensive segments of the world T&C sector (Adhikari and Weeratunge, 
2006).
2 But, as noted in the next section, the anticipated effects of MFA removal were 
not always as expected.   D. Hudson, D. Ethridge, M. Mutuc 
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MFA Elimination: What Was Projected and What Has 
Transpired 
Generally, the elimination of the MFA was presumed to be a net global benefit 
because it represented an elimination of a distortionary set of trade agreements. But 
that presumption was based on the assumption that the underlying global trading 
regime was based on free trade principles. However, due to the trading pattern that has 
emerged after the MFA – with production infrastructure and trading rules based on 
distortionary incentives so entrenched into the system – the global trading regime after 
the elimination of quotas is still far short of free. 
It is worth emphasizing that MFA elimination has not ended trade restrictions in 
T&C: it merely did away with the bilateral trade quotas set by developed T&C 
importing countries, dominated by the United States and the EU, for exporting 
developing countries (Feldman, 2009). The T&C trading system is still substantially 
restricted by tariffs, subsidies, preferential trade agreements and other nontariff 
barriers. It is further worth noting that the models used in analyzing the expected 
adjustments typically assumed that the adjustments are driven primarily by economic 
(cost) differentials among countries and relatively little by non-economic (policy) 
forces across countries. Additionally, the studies typically assumed that international 
trade markets are effectively structurally competitive (absent of monopolistic or 
oligopolistic influences), which may not be a valid assumption (Ethridge, 2007). 
Most of the studies that projected the adjustments from the MFA to the current 
ATC accurately anticipated the direction of T&C trade flow pattern changes for the 
major importers (the United States and the EU) and the major exporters (China and 
India). However, the increase in volume of T&C trade did not materialize, and there 
may have been a decrease in the rate of trade increase since the MFA phase-out (see 
figure 1). For instance, Diao and Somwaru (2001) predicted that textiles and clothing 
trade levels would be 5 percent to 16 percent higher after the ATC. Elbehri (2004) 
anticipated that clothing trade would be 11 percent higher following the ATC.
3 
Further, the generally anticipated price decreases in T&C have been less than were 
anticipated by most studies (Ahmad and Diaz, 2008). Thus, the trade shifts in the 
aggregate have been less dramatic than most models projected. 
A more disaggregated view (that is, country-by-country) of bilateral trade flows of 
individual countries shows significant deviations from projections. Trade flow shifts 
were generally less dramatic than was anticipated. This may be partially explained by 
the industry anticipating adjustments and being proactive in adjusting to the changes 
they had anticipated. That aside, it appears that both China and India have captured 
less of the U.S. and EU markets than was anticipated (Ahmad and Diaz, 2008; Martin,   D. Hudson, D. Ethridge, M. Mutuc 
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2009; Baleix, 2005). The EU’s imports of clothing were forecast to increase by 20 
percent, with the biggest increases from China (27 percent), India (12 percent), and 
Korea (10 percent) (Baleix, 2005), while the actual increase from 2004 to 2007 was 
6.5 percent, and imports from Korea declined by 22.5 percent (Ahmad and Diaz, 
2008). China’s total T&C exports have grown faster than its T&C exports to the 
United States (Martin, 2007). China’s share of global T&C exports increased sharply 
in 2005 following steady growth since 1999, but has slowed since 2005 (Martin, 
2009). 
China and India could have been engaging in “quota-hopping foreign direct 
investment” in order to bypass earlier quota restrictions, thereby leading to less 
expansion in Chinese exports to the U.S. and the EU after the MFA phase-out. Further, 
as China’s T&C production and exports have grown, labour costs in China have risen 
and China has expanded its manufacturing into countries where the cost of labour is 
lower, primarily in Asia (Wang, Wu and Yao, 2008). Could some of the less-than-
anticipated increase in post-MFA T&C exports from China be accounted for by these 
hypotheses? 
Conversely, several developing countries (e.g., Bangladesh and Cambodia) have 
held or increased their T&C exports, counter to most a priori projections (Ahmad and 
Diaz, 2008). What factors explain the relative successes in these cases? Could these 
countries have benefitted from foreign direct investment to build their T&C 
infrastructure during the MFA period and subsequently capitalized on those 
investments through preferential trading arrangements in the aftermath of the MFA? 
Or, could these countries have benefitted from the MFA indirectly and now have to 
use direct and indirect subsidies to keep their less efficient T&C sectors viable? Or, 
could the phase-out of the MFA have simply opened the doors for some countries with 
a natural comparative advantage in T&C to flourish? Answers may be relevant to 
understanding the future directions of the global industry. 
Looking back, the global recession that became obvious in 2008 was an 
unanticipated event that slowed T&C consumption and trade; still, the slowdown in 
T&C trade growth seemed to have already been underway prior to the recession.
4 The 
U.S. and EU markets have dominated the global picture in T&C for many years, at 
least on the consumption side. Most analysts implicitly assume that this will continue 
to be the case. However, with countries such as China and India growing in population 
and economic influence, they may become larger consumer markets as well. Are 
China’s and India’s potential as consumer markets being overlooked because we are 
assuming that those countries will continue their protectionist policies?   D. Hudson, D. Ethridge, M. Mutuc 








Note: Textiles and clothing refers to products covered by HS Section XI (HS chapters 50 
through 63), excluding agricultural textile raw materials classified under HS 5001-03, 5101-03, 
5201-03 and 5301-02. 
Figure 1  Index of world T&C exports (by value) with major quota phase-out periods 
demarked, 1995-2009 (base year = 1995). 
An Overview of the Phase-out of Quotas 
Under the ATC, importing countries phased out quotas for a given percentage of their 
volume of trade in T&C at the start of the years 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2005.
5 Figure 1 
presents global T&C exports indexed to 1995 and marked by quota phase-out years. It 
is apparent in figure 1 that most of the expansion in world trade in T&C did not occur 
until after 2002 (as importing countries waited for the last minute to eliminate quotas 
on items that have high quota or full utilization as these items are of domestic 
interest). Moreover, while the anticipated increase in world trade after the end of the 
ATC in 2005 did occur, the increase was not as steep as anticipated. And following 
2007, the expansion in world trade started to decline. Two hypotheses can be gleaned 
from figure 1. First, some adjustments may have already taken place prior to the end 
of the quotas. Second, the anticipated expansion in world T&C trade after 2005 was 
less dramatic than expected. Weak T&C trade growth after 2005 aside, one should not 
discount the effects of the quota elimination: from 1995 through 2008, world exports 
doubled in value. Rather, the point of this discussion is to highlight that despite the 
gains, trade growth did not meet expectations. 
Several factors likely contributed to the lower-than-expected expansion. These 
include the safeguard provisions against China, trading arrangements, remaining tariff 
barriers and other forms of government intervention by both developed and 
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Safeguard Measures against China 
First, Chinese textiles and clothing were subject to a special textiles safeguard 
provision under the ATC until 31 December 2008, and the U.S. and the EU invoked 
this mechanism. This had the effect of muting the expansion of trade after 2005. 
Second, from 2009 to 2013, WTO members can apply a standard WTO safeguard 
mechanism selectively targeting only China. Third, China is considered a nonmarket 
economy (where domestic prices are fixed by the state) in determining antidumping 
and countervailing measures for 15 years after the date of accession until December 
2016. This allows importing countries to reject information on costs and prices in 
China (Dayaratna-Banda and Whalley, 2007). Instead of having quotas against several 
countries, the current trading environment imposes quotas on China. Several 
countries, apart from the U.S. and the EU, are looking at invoking these safeguard 
measures against China in the near future (Martin, 2007). 
Tariffs and Preferential Trading Arrangements  
A further response to the MFA on the part of developed importing countries involved 
the creation of preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) that allowed for importing 
countries to preserve domestic backward linkages (e.g., yarn) to the international T&C 
sectors. Under PTAs, exports of countries willing to abide by certain rules of origin 
(ROOs) with respect to raw materials used in the finished products enter the importing 
country duty- and quota-free. ROOs ensured that imports incorporated as much 
domestic content as possible by allowing foreign firms to process goods offshore and 
avoid paying duty on domestic components incorporated in the finished, re-imported 
items. The U.S. currently has preferential agreements with a range of Sub-Saharan 
African countries under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), with 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), 
with various economies in the Caribbean under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) 
and with Mexico and Canada under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). 
While PTAs afforded some protection and advantage to preference-receiving 
countries, the ROOs handicapped the production of raw materials such as yarn and 
fabric in these countries. Moreover, the ROOs precluded these countries from 
sourcing raw materials from cheaper sources such as China. At the same time, 
preferential market access continues to distort the tariff structure even after the quota 
removal, as poorer countries that do not receive any preference end up paying more 
than their preference-receiving counterparts (Adhikari and Yamamoto, 2007). For 
example, in 2006, non-PTA countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, 
among others, faced an average tariff of 9 percent on their T&C exports to the U.S.   D. Hudson, D. Ethridge, M. Mutuc 
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while PTA members faced average tariffs that ranged from 0 percent to 8.7 percent 
(WTO, 2008). 
Government Support/Subsidies to the Textiles and Clothing 
Industry 
The elimination of the quotas has illuminated the differences in technology and 
infrastructure among the different countries’ T&C sectors. These differences have 
resulted in differential supports provided by various governments, especially in South 
Asia (table 1). 

















Source of basic data: chart 1, Adhikari and Weeratunge (2006), 135. 
These government support measures are WTO compliant since LDCs and 
developing countries with less than US$1,000 per capita GNP are exempt from rules 
on subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM). Also, subsidies given for production across the board to the entire industrial 
sector, based on some general criteria, can be provided together with subsidies for 
R&D and/or environmental conservation (Adhikari and Yamamoto, 2007). Indeed, the 
global trading landscape in textiles and clothing, while devoid of quotas, remains one 
of managed trade through various WTO-compliant subsidies and measures that 
Support  measures  Bangladesh India  Nepal Pakistan Sri  Lanka 
Support for technological upgrading             √                   √                               √                  √   
Subsidized/preferential credit            √                   √                                                   √   
Creation/designation of textile/garment cities/villages            √                                                    √                     
Special economic/export processing zones            √                   √               √              √                  √         
Duty reduction for the import of inputs/machinery            √                   √               √              √                  √   
Excise, sales tax, VAT refund/reduction             √                   √               √              √                  √   
Income tax holiday/rebate/reduction             √                                    √              √                  √   
T&C-specific infrastructure support                                 √                                                   √   
Incentives for use of local inputs/outputs            √                                                                        √   
Reduction in price of infrastructure            √                    
Export credit insurance            √                    
Writing off unpaid debt/debt forgiveness                                                                                      √   
Human resource/skills development            √                   √                               √                  √   
Image building/quality improvement/market promotion            √                   √               √              √                  √   
R&D support                                                                   √                   
Strengthening domestic capacity to supply inputs                                 √                                √                  √     D. Hudson, D. Ethridge, M. Mutuc 
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introduce new distortions to the sector (the size and consequences of which are 
uncertain). What took 40 years to build up in the T&C sector is rapidly being replaced 
by measures that now favour a new set of exporting countries.
6 
The governments of India and China also provide various support measures to the 
textile industry. In India, export-oriented units (EOUs) and firms importing against an 
advance licence receive a duty drawback (zero duty for EOUs, and duty discounts for 
others) on raw material imports for the export of value-added cotton textiles and other 
industries. Also, imports of capital goods and machinery are allowed at reduced duty 
rates against export obligations (zero duty for a 100 percent EOU). In addition, textile 
exporters are credited back (in the form of scrip) 2 percent of the value of their 
exports to the U.S. and EU, and they can use this credit to import goods duty free 
(USDA FAS, 2010).
7 
China, in general, provides numerous subsidies at multiple levels of government. 
These subsidies include cash grant rewards for exporting, preferential loans to 
exporters, research and development funding to develop new products for export, 
energy subsidies, loan forgiveness, and payments to lower the cost of export credit 
insurance (USTR, 2010). In particular, textile exporters are afforded value added tax 
rebates between 5 percent and 17 percent, and preferential import duties on parts and 
material needed for research and development, such as textile machinery, among 
others, are provided to select enterprises (USTR, 2009). 
The competition has reduced the ability of governments to provide support, so 
that countries with deeper pockets like China and India are able to advance more than 
their counterparts with more limited resources. How fast other economies can catch up 
with China and India may depend on government and private sector support. Perhaps 
in partial response, China has moved somewhat onto higher-quality, less-labour-
intensive T&C product lines. Table 2 presents China’s revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) in T&C. China’s RCA index in T&C is calculated as the share of 
T&C to China’s total exports relative to the share of T&C to total world exports in the 
first three columns of table 2. In the last column, China’s RCA is computed relative to 
developing-country exports instead of world exports. The higher a country’s trade 
share, the higher the RCA index obtained, which suggests greater comparative 
advantage. Table 2 shows that China’s comparative advantage in T&C relative to the 
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Table 2  China’s Revealed Comparative Advantage in Textiles and Clothing 
 
 











aRCA index calculated as share of T&C to China’s total exports relative to the share of T&C to 
world exports. 
bRCA index calculated as share of T&C to China’s total exports relative to the share of T&C to 
developing-country exports. 
Source: table 14.8, Martin (2008), 316. 
Conclusions 
In retrospect, the phase-out of the MFA has several things to teach us about managed 
trade systems in general as well as specifically in the T&C sector. On a general level, 
one can ask if we are any closer to free trade in T&C than we were before the phase-
out of the MFA? The vestiges of the MFA are present in the current T&C trading 
environment. On the supply side, misaligned incentives in response to the quotas have 
brought about production patterns that are not necessarily based on comparative 
advantage and led to the creation of preferential trading arrangements that distort the 
tariff structure where rules of origin have handicapped the capability of raw materials 
production of PTA members. On the demand side, major importers are no longer 
managing trade on a bilateral basis. But quotas have been traded for other nontariff 
measures such as safeguard mechanisms and heightened government support to 
address the infrastructure that was lacking when foreign investments were directed to 
low quota-utilization countries from quota-constrained countries – a decision not 
based on price or cost factors. 
 Textiles
a Clothing
a Textiles  &  Clothing
a Textiles  &  Clothing
b  
1995  2.8  5.0  3.9  2.6 
1996 2.6  5.1  3.9  2.9 
1997  2.4  5.0  3.8  2.8 
1998 2.3  4.7  3.6  2.5 
1999  2.4  4.6  3.6  2.5 
2000 2.4  4.6  3.6  2.7 
2001  2.4  4.2  3.4  2.5 
2002 2.4  3.9  3.2  2.4 
2003  2.5  3.7  3.2  2.3 
2004 2.5  3.5  3.1  2.3 
2005  2.6  3.5  3.1  2.5 
2006 2.6  3.7  3.2  2.9 
2007  2.5  3.6  3.2  2.8 
2008 2.5  3.0  2.8  2.9   D. Hudson, D. Ethridge, M. Mutuc 
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“Market power” in some respects has been shifted from the demand side of the market 
(the U.S. and the EU) to the supply side of the market (China and India) with the 
phase-out of the MFA. Many of the LDCs that were previously “dependent” on the 
major importers are now “dependent” on the major exporters; and all of this has 
occurred with the tacit blessing of the WTO. That is, because of preferential treatment 
given to developing countries for internal subsidies and trade barriers, the policy-
induced market power has been vested in the hands of developing countries with the 
financial wherewithal to subsidize their T&C industries. In short, many of the LDCs 
that were supposed to benefit from bilateral trade have been made no better or even 
worse off because of their inability to internally subsidize their textiles, all with the 
express permission of the WTO. Some developing countries have fared better in the 
trading regime change than most expected. How or why are relevant questions. Have 
some of those countries capitalized on their real comparative economic advantages, or 
have their successes just been the result of more political manipulation? 
The trading landscape has changed from managed trade in a bilateral setting to a 
managed trade regime with measures sanctioned by the WTO in a multilateral setting, 
the consequences of which are uncertain. A central lesson we would offer is that the 
precursors and implementation of the MFA resulted in a trading system not based on 
economic comparative advantage. As such, this system created distortions that 
accumulated over time until the system was sufficiently disjointed as to create 
political impetus for a change. We have, however, moved to another managed trading 
system that will create distortions that will accumulate over time. Are we simply 
headed for another crescendo of calls for a political change in the trading system in 
the not-so-distant future? The last political clash was between “developing” countries 
and the U.S. and the EU. Will the next clash be between the LDCs and the 
“developing” countries? Only time will tell. 
On a more general level, are there lessons from the MFA phase-out for the 
participants in the Doha round? Prior to Doha, multilateral negotiations focused 
primarily on multilateral reduction of trade barriers, and substantial progress was 
achieved, especially for industrial products. After the formation of the WTO, 
objectives were expanded to include fostering development of LDCs. The approach of 
establishing perceived trade advantages for LDCs as a means of achieving that 
objective not only conflicts with the objective of freer trade, but may, as appears to be 
the case in T&C, work against development of some of the LDCs. Are the WTO 
authorities more effective in achieving optimal results for all than are free competitive 
markets?   D. Hudson, D. Ethridge, M. Mutuc 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
1.  Article XXXV is the primary opt-out clause of the GATT. It states that the 
agreement (Schedule of Concessions) “shall not apply as between any contracting 
party and any other contracting party if: (a) the two contracting parties have not 
entered into tariff negotiations with each other, and (b) either of the contracting 
parties, at the time either becomes a contracting party, does not consent to such 
application.” 
2.  China, however, has been producing more higher-quality, less-labour-intensive 
products in recent years as evidenced by its declining revealed comparative 
advantage in textiles and clothing (Martin, 2007).  
3.  Walkenhorst (2003) provides a comprehensive survey of quantitative studies on the 
liberalization of trade in textiles and clothing. 
4.  Because textile production is easier to adjust than other industrial processes, it may 
be that the textile and clothing slowdown was a leading indicator for the 
recession. 
5.  Using a country’s 1990 import volume as a base, import quotas were eliminated in 
four phases (expressed as a percentage of the base): 16 percent on 1 January 1995, 
an additional 17 percent on 1 January 1998, another 18 percent on 1 January 2002 
and the remaining 49 percent on 1 January 2005. Products not yet liberalized but 
subject to quotas or restrained in some manner had their quota growth rates 
increase by 16 percent, 25 percent and 27 percent in each phase, respectively. 
Although the ATC required importing countries to integrate articles from each of 
four categories – tops/yarns, fabrics, made-ups and clothing – they were given the 
flexibility to select which articles to integrate at each phase as no allocation 
percentages were specified. Also, the universal set of product lines included not 
just items that were previously subject to the MFA but also articles that had never 
been restricted for some importing countries. This flexibility allowed for developed 
importing countries to defer integration (also called “backloading”) until 1 January 
2005; 89 percent of apparel imports (most of which are high-value-added clothing 
items) and 47 percent of textile imports were left to be integrated in 2005 (USITC, 
2004), while those integrated in the first three stages were either not subject to 
MFA quotas or were subject to nonbinding quotas or quotas not fully utilized by 
exporting countries. 
6.  It is important to note that developed countries such as the U.S. and the EU do 
internally subsidize their textile sectors through mechanisms such as tax codes, as 
well as provide market distortions through some of the trade policies mentioned 
above. However, developing countries, by virtue of their exemptions through the 
WTO, are capable of subsidizing at much higher percentage rates when it is 
financially feasible. 
7.  Scrip is any substitute for currency that is not legal tender, usually in the form of 
credit. 
 